This article examines how cognitive and normative ideas influence the ability of the European Union (EU) to formulate common policies in response to international crises such as the 2002/2003 Iraq crisis and the Iranian nuclear crisis (since 2002). It argues that in crisis situations, i.e. in highly uncertain circumstances, ideas become often the principal guide for policy-makers. More specifically, ideas foster interpretations of a crisis along several core themes, above all, how the crisis issue is perceived, which means are deemed to be legitimate and/or effective and, depending on the particular crisis, how other relevant themes are seen, e.g. the appropriate relation with the United States. Thus, the formulation of common EU crisis responses depends on the convergence of these interpretations in member states -as in the Iran crisis. On the contrary, if member states' interpretations diverge beyond a common "ideational space" -as in the case of Iraq -dissonance will be the probable outcome.
Introduction
Research on ideational factors in the social sciences has become increasingly influential (Béland and Cox, 2011) , especially on cognitive and normative ideas, i.e. ideas that (Schmidt, 2008: 306) . 1 The European Union (EU) has been at the centre stage of ideational research early on, most notably in integration studies (Jachtenfuchs et al., 1998; Parsons, 2002) and in economic and monetary policy (Jabko, 2006; McNamara, 1999; Quaglia, 2004) . However, apart from a few exceptions (Croft, 2000; Howorth, 2004) , the controversial topic of EU foreign policy cooperation has received little attention, even though various analyses have 3 shown the added value of idea based research in foreign and security policies (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993; Katzenstein, 1996) . It is, therefore, in need of further research (see Bickerton et al., 2011: 10) .
Most research using ideas as variables focuses on nation states, even in studies of the European Union. The explanation of cooperation between states as in the case of the European Union is usually left to one specific function of ideas, namely to 'focal points' (Garrett and Weingast, 1993) or related concepts used in 'strategic constructivism' (Jabko, 2006) that highlight the unifying capacity of certain key ideas. However, in the concrete case of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) such unifying ideas exist only, if at all, as relatively weak concepts, e.g. effective multilateralism.
Nevertheless, ideas may still have explanatory power regarding EU cooperation -or its failure -in international affairs. Both idea based research in the economic realm (McNamara, 1999; Quaglia, 2004) and reflexive approaches to norms (Puetter and Wiener, 2007) suggest that cognitive and normative ideas -or the concrete meaning of certain ideas or norms -in member states influence the (in) ability to establish common policies at the level of the EU. The key issue is how in a given situation ideas in individual EU member states play out in the CFSP.
More specifically, it will be argued that cognitive and normative ideas in member states may foster either converging or diverging interpretations of specific international circumstances in terms of issue at stake, instrumentality, i.e. '... the instruments or 4 means that states find available and appropriate' (Kowert and Legro, 1996: 463) , and in terms of other factors such as transatlantic relations, thus either facilitating or impeding common EU policies. The crucial question that this article will deal with is, in particular, if these interpretations converge so much at the level of the EU that they fall within the limits of a common ideational space separating possible and impossible agreement on common policies in international crises -thus, bringing about consensus -or if they diverge beyond the limits of this space, leading to dissonance. In this way, the article contributes to what has been recently identified as one of the key research challenges in European foreign and security policy: 'why is it that European cooperation in foreign, security, and defense policy (...) seems to work and hold together in some specific instances yet not in others?' (Krotz and Maher, 2011: 549) .
Admittedly, in an essentially intergovernmental policy area as the CFSP, where all member states are de facto veto players, ideas may not be the only variables that can explain the (in) ability of the EU to act collectively in international affairs. However, the existing idea based research suggests that at least in circumstances of high uncertainty where no clear pre-given interests exist, ideas can make a significant difference, as they help decision-makers to make sense of a given situation (McNamara, 1999; Howorth, 2004) . It is, thus, in these circumstances where ideas may have a decisive impact on the EU's ability to formulate a common response or not. The high uncertainty of international crises, not least in the field of security, turns crisis situations into particularly suitable case studies to explore the role of ideas (see Bratberg, 2011) . In the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) two crises have occurred that are potentially very illustrative, as they led in one instance to failed and, in the other case, to substantial (though not necessarily successful) European foreign policy output: the 2003 Iraq war and its prelude (Menon, 2004; Puetter and Wiener, 2007) and the Iranian nuclear crisis after 2002 (Dryburgh, 2008; Sauer, 2008; Harnisch, 2007) .
The article begins with an outline of the framework that conceptualises the role of ideas in either facilitating or impeding EU policies in international crises. After a brief justification of the case study selection, I will proceed examining empirically how cognitive and normative ideas led to diverging or converging interpretations of the Iraq and Iran crises and, thus, to either dissonance or consensus in the EU. Following other studies on European foreign and security policy (Mérand et al., 2011; Wagnsson, 2010) , the main focus will be on the dominant interpretations in the key member statesBritain, France and Germany -as within the constraints of this article it is not possible to examine in detail all the idiosyncratic processes that led to certain interpretations in all member states. Finally, I will outline what this analysis reveals about the ideational space mentioned above and link it to the broader research on European foreign and security policies.
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Conceptual framework
Generally, the EU deals with international problems such as the Iraqi and Iranian crises in the context of the CFSP, formerly the EU's so-called second pillar. Institutionally, this means that basically all decisions have to be taken by consensus or collective agreement, i.e. the set-up of the CFSP remains essentially intergovernmental (Wagner, 2003) . Consequently, some analysts are quite sceptical about the capability of the EU to act independently of the interests of its member states in international affairs (Hoffmann, 2000) . However, the institutionalization and socialization literature has
shown that the clash of 'national interests' of member states is not the norm in the CFSP. On the contrary, during the last 40 years the EU has established numerous institutions, legal rules, norms and habits such as the well-known coordination reflex that facilitate increased cooperation among member states (Smith, 2004 ). An emerging body of literature on Brussels based bureaucracies and institutions has even highlighted the increasingly prominent role of supranational elements in EU decision-making in foreign and security policy (Cross, 2007; Vanhoonacker et al., 2010) . This article does not go so far as to concede supranational elements a dominant role in international crises, in particular if they are highly politicised and mediatised (see Vanhoonacker et al., 2010: 23) . In line with recent findings from the network literature on the EU, it assumes that '... a handful of traditional state actors retain strategic positions vis-a-vis weaker supranational and non-state actors' (Mérand et al., 2011: 122 McNamara, 1999: 457) . In other words, it is based on cognitive and normative ideas. More specifically, ideas lead to 'policy prescriptions', i.e. 'precise causal ideas that facilitate policymaking by specifying how to solve particular policy problems' (Tannenwald, 2005: 16; see Schmidt, 2008: 306) .
However, in intergovernmental contexts as the EU, cognitive and normative ideas do not necessarily have the same consequences among different actors. Although EU member states share common 'fundamental norms' (Puetter and Wiener, 2007) , they do not foster directly coherent policy prescriptions in the EU. Member states may contest,
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for example, what these 'fundamental norms' mean in practice (Puetter and Wiener, 2007) . Likewise, member states may simply be influenced by different -and maybe contradictory -ideas, as a recent study of the EU as a normative power has highlighted (Wagnsson, 2010) . For example, some member states may favour in a certain crisis military intervention based on the defence of human right norms, while others may reject such actions based on the equally well established norm of non-intervention.
After all, the EU as a whole does not have a fully-fledged common strategic culture, as the literature in this field concedes (Meyer, 2006) . In brief, different, or different meanings of cognitive and normative ideas may lead to diverging policy prescriptions that are difficult to reconcile in 'coordinative discourses' (see Schmidt, 2008: 310-311) between national and European policy-makers at the EU level. Ultimately, this will lead to incoherent or no policy formulation at all.
Yet, despite these potentially disrupting consequences of ideas, they also have certain characteristics that benefit common policy responses to international crises. Most notably, they are relatively 'malleable' (Béland and Cox, 2011: 10) , especially in comparison with fixed interests, and leave usually different policy response options open, i.e. they constrain but do not determine options (see Campbell, 1998: 384-385 ).
This facilitates greatly agreement in the aforementioned coordinative discourses between policy-makers, particularly in such highly institutionalised settings as the CFSP, where actors are '…structurally bound to co-operate in other policy areas' 9 (Howorth, 2004: 229; see also Schmidt, 2008: 313) . Therefore, the formulation of EU level policies in the international arena can be generally achieved if ideas foster broadly converging interpretations of a crisis among actors. Similar to the 'congruence building'
between emerging global and existing local norms in the norm localization literature (Acharya, 2011) , the crucial issue is not the complete acceptance or rejection of a specific idea in a crisis but building congruence between the emerging common interpretation of a crisis and the interpretations in different EU member states.
Furthermore, it is possible that among deeply integrated states simply similar cognitive and normative ideas dominate, bringing about converging interpretations of specific events and, ultimately, converging policy prescriptions.
In order to analyse concrete cases of convergence or divergence of crisis interpretations at the EU level it is necessary to focus on the relevant cognitive and normative ideas in international crises. In short, which ideas matter? First, cognitive and normative ideas that influence the perception of the issue at stake are crucial. In the words of Béland, 'ideas participate in the construction of the issues and problems that enter the policy agenda' (Béland, 2009: 704) . Secondly, as Mehta (2011: 33) has pointed out, the definition of an issue or problem does not determine the actual policy choices to deal with that issue or problem. Thus, once an issue is defined in a specific way, certain cognitive and normative ideas also inform how it should be dealt with. They help to answer questions about the effectiveness and legitimacy of certain policy responses.
More specifically, ideas constrain the available options that are considered to be effective or legitimate (Campbell, 1998: 385 ; see also Kowert and Legro, 1996: 463-465) . Thirdly, apart from the ideas that fulfil these basic functions in an international crises, other ideas may also be relevant, in particular those that interpret intervening -- Figure 1 presented on separate sheet at the end of the article --It is assumed that within EU member states cognitive and normative ideas can foster almost any interpretation along the three axes. The more these interpretations move towards one of the six extremes the unlikelier it is that consensus can be reached. On the contrary, if the interpretations converge towards the centre, the more compromise is likely. Depending on the issue at stake the consensus can obviously move to a certain extent towards one or another extreme, but may not go beyond certain limits. If the three axes are put into a three-dimensional chart -highlighting, thus, the ultimately interlinked character of the axes -these limits can be imagined as a flexible sphere that connects the border points between likely and unlikely consensus on the three axes (see grey sphere in Figure 1 ). It is in this ideational space that common foreign policy can be actually established. However, if the interpretations in one or more member states approach too much one of the extremes or opposing extremes simultaneously, they will move beyond this space of likely consensus. Thus, the result will be dissonance among member states and the failure of the EU to respond forcefully to an international crisis.
Case study selection
The conceptual framework requires at least two comparable case studies to demonstrate how it works in practice: on the one hand, one case of forceful EU policy output where converging interpretations along the three axes of Figure Apart from the comparability of the Iraq and Iran cases, the two cases also appear to be particularly worthwhile case studies for an idea based approach: First, both the regime in Tehran and the pre-invasion regime in Baghdad are or were very closed nondemocratic political systems where it was extremely difficult to obtain reliable information, in particular intelligence information about their alleged WMD programmes. This led to circumstances of high uncertainty for policy-makers, i.e.
situations that are particular conducive to the role of ideas. Secondly, obvious material interests by certain member states, which may override an idea based approach, have been largely absent, most notably, in the commercial field. Although some member states had important commercial relationships with Iraq and Iran, the existing literature agrees that they were not decisive in the two crises (Gordon and Shapiro, 2004: 77-78; Smeland, 2004: 44) . , 2007: 209-215; Bluth, 2004: 884) : 'My judgement as prime minister is that this threat is real, growing and of an entirely different nature to any conventional threat to our security that Britain has faced before' (Blair, 2003 (Gordon and Shapiro, 2004: 83; Finnemore, 2005: 202) . This perception has been already well documented in several studies on France and Germany during the Iraq crisis (Coicaud, 2006; Davidson, 2011: 150; Forsberg, 2005: 223; Müller, 2003: 6-7; Pond, 2005: 36 Closely related to the diverging perception of the Iraq issue was the question how it should be dealt with. Since the United States was increasingly determined to intervene militarily in Iraq, the key question was the potential participation in military actions led by the United States. In essence, the EU had the option to support, tolerate or oppose the war collectively. An important dimension in this regard was certainly the transatlantic relationship, as will be shown further on. However, it would be too simplistic to explain crucial decisions about war and peace merely in terms of transatlantic relations. As the research on a European strategic culture has made clear (Meyer, 2006) , specific beliefs about the use of force play also a major role. That is, apart from the transatlantic relationship, it were also specific ideas about instrumentality that led to the acceptance or rejection of concrete means in Iraq. The case of Britain shows how at least some of the supporters of the Iraq war were influenced by their own ideas about the legitimacy and effectiveness of military means (Kennedy-Pipe and Vickers, 2007: 207; see Bluth, 2004: 875) . In Blair's public statements it becomes clear that he believed that a military invasion was both more legitimate and effective than the available alternatives: 'The judgment is this: would it have been better or more practical to have contained him through continuing sanctions and weapons inspections, or was this inevitably going to be, at some point, a policy that failed…?' (Blair, 2004 ; see also Gordon and Shapiro, 2004: 175) . Blair and his supporters had particularly the failures of the international Iraq policies in the 1990s to contain and disarm Iraq effectively in their mind. According to Bluth (2004: 871) , 'The case of war rested on the premise that the containment of Iraq through sanctions was becoming ineffective and was morally unacceptable because of its effects on the Iraqi population…'.
At the same time, the opponents of the use of force believed that containment, sanctions and inspections had been working in Iraq. Therefore, they advocated their continuing use, especially regarding the alleged Iraqi WMD programme: 'Precisely because of the effectiveness of the work of the inspectors, we must continue to seek a peaceful solution to the crisis' (Fischer, 2003 ; see also Pond, 2005: 34) . Germany did also see the use of force as an inappropriate means in the Iraq case (Forsberg, 2005; Müller, 2003: 18 Figure 1 are interrelated -these member states have to decide whether they should follow US leadership despite these disagreements or not. In the case of Iraq, a large number of member states was in such a situation: 'Americans perceived a much more serious threat from Iraq than did France or Germany; (...)
Americans, and the Bush Administration in particular, were much less confident in the ability of non-forceful tools, such as UN inspectors, to protect them from threats' (Finnemore, 2005: 189) . The key issue was that those member states that disagreed with the United States decided to defy openly the US leadership (Gordon and Shapiro, 2004: 175 superpower that should not be opposed in matters that it considers to be crucial for its security (see Gordon and Shapiro, 2004: 79-80; Menon, 2004: 638-640) . British leaders, in particular Blair, believed that only a strategic partnership with the remaining superpower in the world could make the international system more secure (Menon, 2004: 638 think it will be dangerous and destabilising' (Newman and Stephens, 2003) . According to Gordon and Shapiro (2004: 131) , Blair even told regularly that '…he would prefer a divided Europe that was partly pro-American to a united Europe lined up against the United States'. Likewise, a more recent study highlights the importance of the value of the transatlantic alliance for the British government during the Iraq crisis (Davidson, 2011: 134) .
For the French and German governments, on the other hand, the transatlantic relationship did not have the same importance. French leaders in particular saw the relationship rather as part of a broader multipolar system. In fact, a key element in the Iraq speeches of Jacques Chirac, then the French President, was Europe's common voice in a multipolar world (Bratberg, 2011) . Thus, French leaders, and in particular Chirac, interpreted the transatlantic relationship in a dominantly Europeanist way, where Europe's own role took precedence over other considerations. At the eve of the invasion of Iraq, for instance, Chirac was quoted as saying 'Any community with only one dominant power is always a dangerous one (...) That's why I favor a multipolar world, in which Europe obviously has its place' (Graff, 2003) . These Europeanist interpretations were paralleled in Germany by a marked foreign policy change towards a more independent stance in relation with the United States (Forsberg, 2005: 224) . As the German Foreign Minister at that time pointedly said, 'alliance partners are not satellites' (Fischer, 2002) . Consequently, even for Germany, 'The question at stake was the nature of the world order and the USA's relation to its allies, no longer the single issue of Iraq' (Forsberg, 2005: 226; see Maull, 2008) . In sum, Britain, France and Germany pushed their interpretations of the transatlantic relationship into opposing directions: Atlanticism, on the one hand, and Europeanism, on the other. Together with the diverging issue perceptions and beliefs about effective and legitimate means, this led to diverging interpretations that remained outside the common sphere of Figure 1 , thus making common policy output impossible.
Iran
In the case of the early Iranian crisis (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , member states' perceptions of the issue at stake were very similar: First of all, they believed since the very beginning that a substantial nuclear programme with military implications existed in Iran (Everts, 2004: 675; Youngs, 2006: 77) . Furthermore, member states also shared the relatively moderate intelligence assessment that it was a serious long-term concern and not a clear-cut threat (Müller, 2003: 7) . Even the assessment of the British government was explicitly moderate. According to a written answer in the British parliament, 'The technology which Iran has been seeking to develop at its nuclear facilities would enable them to produce fissile material, which can be used in the production of nuclear years, French sable-rattling (Yost, 2006) and British war plans (Hopkins, 2011) indicate that the use of military force is not excluded categorically by all EU member states (see Hanau Santini, 2010: 469, 482) . In fact, elite surveys (Martinez, 2006: 15) (Sauer, 2008: 278-281, 286-288) , ultimately the sanction approach prevailed. As the European Elites Survey after the first round of sanctions highlighted, this preference for a sanctions approach clearly reflected the widespread belief of European policy-makers in sanctions as the most effective way to deal with Iran (Dau, 2007: 16) . In the words of Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the German foreign minister after November 2005, 'Excluding economic sanctions would be imprudent' (Aust et al., 2006) . Consequently, the EU could shift its policy means from a pure negotiation based approach to one that used both negotiations and sanctions when it believed that the new approach was both more legitimate and effective.
Apart from the concrete means to be used in the Iranian nuclear crisis, the EU was also able to find a common action format that was believed to be legitimate and effective in in how far the two sides actually diverged (Einhorn, 2004; Smeland, 2004: 57-64) .
Although the US administration suffered from some internal divisions regarding Iran between (Kubbig, 2008 , in general the US approach towards Iran was substantially more outspoken than the EU approach: It advocated regime change, strict sanctions and the further international isolation of Iran (Rudolf, 2007) . The crucial point for this article is that no European government supported these more radical US positions. On the contrary, the EU as a whole opposed the more extreme policy options by the United States (Kile, 2005: 13) . Even Blair argued that the British Iran strategy was '…different from the US administration…it is one of constructive and conditional engagement with the government of Iran' (quoted in Davidson and Powers, 2005: 421) .
More specifically, before 2005 the EU/E3 resisted several times US pressure to refer the Iranian nuclear file from the IAEA to the UN Security Council (Denza, 2005: 306 over Iran could even trigger another major transatlantic crisis (Black and Traynor, 2003) . Furthermore, the US administration criticised and discouraged the EU/E3
negotiations with Iran from 2003 on (Warrick, 2003) . Apparently, George W. Bush even asked Blair personally not to sign the 2003 Tehran Agreement (Youngs, 2006: 79) .
Although internal divisions within the US administration prevented a more forceful opposition to the EU approach, the United States essentially undermined the EU negotiations with Iran by continuing its strict sanctioning policy and refusing key concessions the Iranian negotiators were seeking, in particular security guarantees and support for Iran's entry in the World Trade Organization (Bergenäs, 2010: 503; Harnisch, 2007 (Seaboyer and Thränert, 2007: 114) , in particular regarding the potential referral of Iran to the UN Security Council (Kile, 2005: 19; Youngs, 2006: 82) and, for the first time, regarding the outright rejection of limited uranium enrichment activities in Iran (Sauer, 2008: 288 7). Likewise, Solana and the E3 foreign ministers at the time argued with a specific reference to the United States that 'We will continue to work for a united international approach which is necessary to maximise the chances of success' (Barnier et al., 2005: 5) . already by a recent review article on CFSP (Krotz and Maher, 2011: 549) . The key argument of this article is that in many international crises, such as Iraq or Iran, crisis responses depend on cognitive and normative ideas that guide actions under conditions of high uncertainty. Conceptually, the question is not whether (Parsons, 2002) or whose (Acharya, 2011) ideas matter but -in line with the most recent idea based researchhow ideas matter (Mehta, 2011: 25) . More specifically, cognitive and normative ideas foster certain interpretations of a crisis along several interrelated core themes, in particular, issue perception, instrumentality and, depending on the crisis, transatlantic relations or other themes. Thus, despite the intergovernmental set-up of the CFSP, the EU does not have to reconcile or coordinate in many international crises opposing national interests based on clear-cut material constraints, but merely the different interpretations of its member states along these themes. As long as these interpretations converge, measured, though still forceful crisis responses will be likely. Yet, if they diverge, dissonance will be the probable outcome. The empirical analysis has shown how -at the European level -the interpretations of the Iraq case diverged in the three areas of issue perception, instrumentality and transatlantic relations, whereas in the case of Iran these interpretations converged towards a moderate centre.
Comparing the results, finally, allows drawing up an indicative picture of the ideational space of Figure 1 within which the EU can find foreign policy consensus during international crises: First, the interpretation of an issue in a given situation may not tend towards the extreme form of an immediate threat for one or several EU member states, unless the circumstances are very obvious. Otherwise, it is very unlikely that all member states follow such an issue perception. In general, it is much more likely that the perceptions of an issue are found between the extremes of key and non-issue such as in the case of Iran, where its nuclear programme has been interpreted as a 'serious concern'. Secondly, as both the Iraq and Iran case have shown, the EU is able to agree on coercive measures as both effective and legitimate means. Military force, however, is much more problematic, especially if it takes the form of a full-scale invasion of another country. At the same time, pure persuasion in the form of dialogue, the other extreme option to act in an international crisis, is only a possibility if the EU does not have to deal with a concrete security problem. As the European reactions to the Iranian crisis have shown, it is very unlikely that all EU member states believe that persuasive means are the most effective and legitimate way to deal with a crisis that is considered to be serious. In practice, common EU actions typically oscillate between negotiations and sanctions. Thirdly, whenever the EU has to find consensus concerning US leadership in an international crisis, not only over-emphasizing the importance of the transatlantic relationship but also straightforward balancing appear to be outside the limits of a collective European foreign policy, as the Iraq case suggests. Usually, the EU's relations with the United States entail both elements that emphasise the need of the 
